I offer a simple framework to address why state intervention in the financial system, prevalent in less developed economies, yields various welfare outcomes, and why such conventional reforms as privatization and fiscal reforms prove insufficient to eliminate state intervention. In the model three institutional factors are in play: 1) control rights over financial institutions; 2) cash-flow rights of the private over financial institutions; 3) monitoring capability of the public on tax/resource collection by the state. Based on the model, I show that state intervention can be developmental or derogatory depending on institutional traits including degree of privatization and monitoring capability of the public over the tax collection by the state. Further I illustrate that as long as state has control rights, conventional reforms such as fiscal reform and privatization may not be enough in eliminating state intervention in the financial system.
INTRODUCTION
State intervention in the financial system is prevalent. In a number of countries, states directly own financial institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) ). Even when private owners exist, states in many countries routinely intervene in managerial operation of privately owned financial institutions hamstringing the legal ownership structure. Persistence as well as existence of state intervention in the financial system gives rise to natural questions: can state intervention be welfare-enhancing?; why does even seemingly welfare-impairing state intervention persist? * I thank seminar participants at Chung-Ang University in Seoul, Korea for their helpful comments. I also gratefully acknowledge that this paper was supported by the Chung-Ang University Academic Research Fund The traditional mainstream view in economics puts forward simple and strict answers. Indicting state intervention in general as distortionary, mainstream economists denounce state control of financial resource allocation as 'financial repression' that hinders financial deepening and economic growth (McKinnon (1973) , Shaw (1973) ).
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Along the view, agenda of financial liberalization including privatization and market deregulation were evolved to gain policy priority in the IMF and the World Bank in the late 1970s and begun to be implemented in Latin American economies. Results were often devastating. A series of financial crises frequented the region during the following decades and the sequence of 'half-hearted liberalization, financial fragility and re-intervention' arose (Diaz-Alejandro (1985) ). The diagnosis of the mainstream view, which also constitutes its answer for the second question above, is that successful removal of state intervention in the financial system requires fiscal discipline (Dornbush and Edwards (1989) , McKinnon (1993) ). The argument goes that in the absence of fiscal discipline, state tends to stick to financial sector intervention as it seeks to mobilize resources through non-regular channels such as inflationary tax and direct exploitation of resources in financial institutions.
Plausible it may be in the context of Latin American economies, the traditional view that state intervention in the financial system is bad and rooted in the lack of fiscal discipline appears less conforming to experiences of Asian economies, in particular so called the Asian tigers. During the decades before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, these economies registered illustrious growth performance in the presence of strong state intervention in the financial system. The success stories, often praised as 'Asian miracles', beg a question why state intervention in the financial system seems to coexist with various welfare consequences, challenging the general premise of the mainstream view on state intervention. Further, episodes of financial liberalization in the Asian economies, unfolded more recently, demand the mainstream view uneasy explanation as well. While fiscal prudence, the precondition for successful financial liberalization posited by the mainstream view, apparently existed, financial liberalization processes in the Asian economies that culminated as the financial crisis of 1997 proved to be slow and turbulent.
Alternative school of thought to the traditional view does exist. Centered around experiences of the Asian tigers plus Japan, a group of researchers in political economy coin a new term of 'the Developmental State', arguing that state intervention could be welfare-enhancing (Johnson (1982) , Amsden (1989) , Wade (1990) ). Following the Gerschenkronian idea (Gerschenkron (1962) ; for a modern formulation, see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ), they embrace state intervention in less developed economies, where market system is yet to be mature, as a way to improve the allocation of resources and spur development. While mainstream economists rather ignore the first question of the welfare implication of state intervention and focus on the second question of how to remove it, the developmental state school seeks to identify conditions that may render state intervention welfare enhancing. Thus, in explaining the differentiated macroeconomic performance between Asian and Latin American countries, adherents of the developmental state view contend that economic efficiency of the two regions differed because bureaucrats in the Asian developmental state were 'purposeful' while those in the Latin American derogatory state were 'drifter' (Dore (1990) ), and/or because the Asian developmental states were guided by such growth-conforming ideologies as 'industrialism' and 'nationalism'.
But, if one simply attributes the difference in welfare outcomes of state intervention to the difference in types of a state as the developmental state view does, answering the second question becomes problematic. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, even the developmental state school admits that state intervention in the former developmental states may have lasted too long exceeding its productive use.
2 Despite the admittance, no convincing explanation for why state intervention persisted too long has been given, other than the trivial conjecture that the type of a state may have changed rendering a former developmental state a derogatory state.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that driving forces of the evolution of state intervention in the financial system in developing economies are institutions. In general terms, the main idea is that state intervenes in the financial system because it has capacity to do so; the private allows state intervention because it lacks capacity to resist; welfare implications of state intervention differ depending on the deterring power of the private against state intervention; as long as the state has intervening capacity, reforming other institutional features of the economy does not guarantee complete disappearance of state intervention.
Specifically, I propose a model similar to Shleifer and Vishny (1994) , where following the incomplete contract approach, control rights can be separated from cash-flow rights or legal ownership. 3 In the model three institutional factors are in play: 1) control rights over financial institutions; I take them historically given to the state, 2) cash-flow rights of the private over financial institutions; I assume that 'privatization' in the model implies transfer of cash-flow rights from the state to the private, 3) monitoring capability of the public on tax/resource collection by the state; I assume that fiscal reform refers to the strengthening of the monitoring capability of the pubic. Based on the model, I show that state intervention can be developmental or derogatory depending on institutional traits including degree of privatization and monitoring capability of the 2 For example, in Woo-Cumings (1999) , one of the most recent collection of the papers of the developmental state view, it can be seen that many authors take more cautious stance in endorsing the favorable evaluation of Asian interventionist states with respect to social welfare implications. 3 See Hart (1995) for detailed discussion on ownership in terms of incomplete approach. public over the tax collection by the state. Further I illustrate that as long as state has control rights, such conventional reforms as fiscal reform and privatization may not be enough for elimination of state intervention in the financial system.
The critical notion of the paper is that in some countries the state can exert control rights over financial institutions regardless of legal ownership structure. The idea itself can be found in the developmental school literature in a descriptive form. For example, Woo-Cumings (1999) claims that there exists a category of economic relationship that is neither free-market nor socialist. She explains that in the former system private ownership coincides with private control, while in the latter both ownership and controling power remain in the state. In the developmental state, she contends, private ownership is "conjoined" with state guidance. In this paper, I develop the idea into a model where crucial institutional factors are clearly specified.
Another important presumption the model of the paper hinges on is that apparatus of rent-seeking and control by the state comprise institutions deeply rooted in the society, and so reforming of those institutions is harder than such conventional reforms as fiscal reform and privatization. One may connect this paper to the recent literature that posits the legal origin as an important factor for financial development of an economy (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998 ). This reading of the paper can be justified if the legal origin of an economy represents institutional characteristics of the economy concerning state's control rights over the financial system.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, to justify the critical assumption of the paper that the state is equipped with controlling right over the financial system regardless of legal ownership structure, I briefly describe institutional features on the interface between the state and the private in Korea. In Section 3 and 4, the model of the paper is introduced and analyzed. Section 5 discusses effectiveness of conventional reforms such as privatization and fiscal reform. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
BACKGROUND
Although the framework in the paper is relevant for most of developing economies, I present the Korean case as a motivating example. The purpose of the case description is two-folded: to justify the key assumption of the model that state has capacity to exert controlling rights irrespective of de jure ownership structure; to demonstrate that the model of the paper is structured to capture major characteristics of financial evolution processes in developing economies.
Institutional Characteristics of the Interface between the State and Financial Markets in Korea
Until the financial crisis of 1997, three institutional traits characterized the interface between the state and the financial sector in Korea: state supremacy in the legal system; dominance of the state (government) over the financial supervisory body; strict legal formalism or positive regulation system. 4 
State Supremacy in the Legal System
The 'state supremacy' points to the convention that the administrative body practically assumed both functions of legislation and enforcement/interpretation of financial regulations. In Korea government officials in the Ministry of Finance and Economy 5 drafted and amended all the bills related to the financial sector. The legislative body, the National Assembly, rarely made its own case and almost automatically approved proposed bills by the government. Lower level regulations such as presidential decrees, ministry orders and supervisory agency regulations are also under the control of the same government body. Thus, the government ruled the whole financial regulation making process. The passivity of the legislative body was shared by the court as well. Korea imported the German legal system, channeled through Japan. Hence, it shares the common feature of the German Civil law system that roles of the judge and the court in the legal system is limited relative to the English Common law system. In enforcing financial regulations, the passivity of the court of Korea has been particularly conspicuous. Any case of court debates on possible constitutional or/and legal violations by financial regulations or financial regulators cannot be found. In the absence of the legislative body initiative and the court review, the government enjoyed maximum discretionary power in making and enforcing of regulations.
Dominance of the Government over the Supervisory Body
The Korean financial system before the crisis of 1997 is notable in that the government maintained de facto governing power over the whole financial supervisory body regardless of de jure governance structure. Such regulatory functions as rule making were simply part of the government job as aforementioned. In addition, the government exerted managerial discretion over entities forming the supervisory body by appointing key executive officers and constantly masterminding major decisions.
Strict Legal Formalism/ Positive Regulation System
'Legal formalism' refers to that activities of financial institutions and markets are required to be recognized by the regulator beforehand. Some extent of legal formalism exists in each country. In fact, one might say that the origin of financial statutory acts in advanced countries and public financial supervisors such as the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) in the US was to force certain financial activities to be recognized and thus monitored by public supervisors. What distinguishes the Korean case from advanced countries lies in the regulatory attitude toward other activities that are not mentioned in statutory regulations. In countries under the English Common law tradition, economic agents including financial institutions are entitled to engage in all other market activities otherwise stipulated in regulations. On the contrary, under the Korean financial regulations, financial institutions can conduct only those activities that are specifically recognized by law and thus chartered by the regulator. For example, in the US securities companies are required to register to the SEC in order to act as securities broker and certain activities including commercial banking activities are specifically prohibited. But, in the absence of other regulatory provisos restricting business scope, they are free to pursue other businesses. 6 In contrast to the 'negative' regulation system of the US, the Korean regulation takes the 'positive system'. In every financial regulation concerning business operation of financial institutions, there is a proviso that generally prohibits all the economic activities. Then, another proviso in the same regulation allows only certain businesses recognized 'proper' for financial institutions by specifically listing them. As a result, new financial instruments such as derivatives could not be dealt by Korean securities firms until they were allowed to do so by amending related regulations.
Brief History of the Korean Financial System

Birth of the State Control
Scholars of the developmental state school claim that institutional capacity of the developmental state existed in Korea as historical legacy. Lim (2000) notes that the tradition of central government control had always been a crucial feature of the Korean medieval history. Others argue for the role of the Japanese colonial period. Johnson (1995, p.13 ) observes that, in Japan "the bureaucracy drafts virtually all laws, ordinances, orders, regulations, and licenses that govern society. It also has extensive extra-legal powers of 'administrative guidance' and is comparatively unrestrained in any way, both in theory and in practice, by the judicial system." Kohil (1999) argues that institutional foundation of the developmental state took a root in Korea as early as during the colonial period when Japan diffused such legal and bureaucracy system as described by Johnson. 7 In the presence of the institutional foundation, explicit control of the financial system by the state came to existence in modern Korea around 1960 under the Park Chung Hee administration. Declaring "economic modernization" as the national agenda, Park's government set out to subjugate the financial sector to the state. In 1962 the "Bank Of Korea Act" was amended to strengthen the government's control over monetary policy. Under the new act, the minister of the Ministry of Finance appointed other members of the Board including the governor of the Bank Of Korea and retained the power to overrule board decisions. 8 In addition, the Park administration took steps to nationalize commercial banks. Private owners of commercial banks were accused of tax evasion and other illegal business practices, and their equity shares in commercial banks confiscated.
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Persistence of the State Control
Financial liberalization in Korea began in the 1980s, influenced by the global trend. First, privatization of banks were pursued. In the early 1980s the government began divesting its stake in government-owned banks, which were completed toward the end of the 1980s. As a next step, over the 1990s the government-owned special purpose banks were transformed into regular commercial banks and privatized subsequently. However, despite the newly established private ownership, the government apparently maintained controlling power over the privatized banks. The government routinely interfered in major managerial decisions of banks while key managers of banks were de facto appointed by the government who were mostly former government officials.
Deregulation measures, which were adopted In tandem with privatization, resulted in a similar consequence. For example, first attempts of interest rate liberalization in the 1980s went abortive.
10 Over the 1990s, measures of interest rate liberalization were implemented but extremely slowly. Thus, major interest rates were under the 7 See also Cumings (1987) for a similar claim. 8 This account of the BOK Act amendment draws on Park (1982) . 9 Description of the nationalization process is due to Lim (2000) . 10 In 1981 the government introduced commercial paper (CP) without any restriction over issuance rates. But, shortly after CP rates became subject to regulation, as the government deemed market rate excessive. In December 1988, the government declared that most of the lending rates of banks and non-bank financial institutions were to be liberalized. However, the government effectively resumed interest regulations in 1989, when the interest rate became unstable as a result of high inflation. government control until the crisis of 1997. Kim and Shin (2003) , in their review of Korea's financial liberalization concludes as follows: "... until the late 1980s financial market in Korea was heavily regulated. And when efforts for financial liberalization were made beginning in the 1990s, the pace of liberalization remained cautiously slow until the crisis of 1997. ... government intervention persisted despite liberalization. As to financial market opening, the Korean government maintained lukewarm stance." 3. THE MODEL I suppose an interventionist economy where the state completely controls its financial system. In the economy, following Shleifer and Vishny (1994) , legal contracts are assumed incomplete so that control rights and cash-flow rights are completely separable. As suggested by the description of the Korean case, in this economy the state is given institutional capacity to exercise control rights over the financial system, regardless of legal ownership of financial institutions.
In the model, in particular, I assume that legal ownership guarantees only cash-flow rights. Further I assume that As a result, private shareholders are subservient to the state and remain passive in determining financial flows. What they are entitled to is returns for their investment in financial institutions. In other words, legal rights only guarantee cash-flow rights, denoted by K β in the model.
The first line of the model describes the state behavior. The state exercises complete control over the financial system and so decides financial flow f. When controling financial flows f, the state maximize its payoff function B(f). The state needs to fulfill the incentive compatibility condition of private shareholders, which is given as (IC) in the model where R is the reservation rate of return for private shareholders.
In satisfying the incentive compatibility condition, the state is assumed to make use of ex-post money transfer, I. The provision of transfer is based on tax collection, raising of which incurs political costs. C(I), the function of political costs may be discontinous at I=0, implying that political cost may jump from zero to a certain positive value when the state impose taxes for the purpose of the transfer financing. Note that, in the model, explicit tax collection is the only source that entails political costs to the state. In particular, when the state owns portion of shares in the financial system, the state has no obligation to achieve reservation returns for the investment. The incentive compatibility condition of the model is constructed to embody this feature. In the condition, the portion of private agents' share-holdings out of the total capital investment K in the financial system is denoted by β , and the state needs to guarantee the reservation return rate only for the private share-holdings. I define β as 'privatization rate'.
The profit function ) ( f π depicts the profit schedule at each level of f. It is assumed to be a usual concave function, taking its maximum at . To allow a room for the developmental state view, I suppose that state intervention may exploit positive externality and so the social profit function is different from the private profit
In particular, the social profit function attains its maximum at , where , are equal to or larger than , respectively.
Incorporating the assumption, with state intervention, (IC) is changed to
Also following the tradition in the literature of public economics, I assume that tax collection incurs the dead weight loss along an increasing convex function d(I) in . I assume that and
. I conceive the social welfare function as the social profit function after subtracting the dead weight loss. Rent to the state, which is specified below, does not enter the social welfare function because it is considered pure redistributive transfer.
Finally, I assume that in controlling the financial system, the state has both rent seeking and social planning motive. Formally, I specify the payoff function B(f) of an interventionist state as a convex combination of the social welfare function and non-pecuniary rent, represented by .
is a concave and increasing function of f with . The assumption 0 ) ( =
M p f B
11 That is, private financial resource allocation underinvests in certain positive externality-yielding projects.
reflects the notion that politicians/bureaucrats receive more rent as the state controls larger financial flows. It is assumed that positive non-pecuniary rent occurs only when state-chosen level of financial flows exceed the level that market would select. It reflects the idea that politicians can reap non-pecuniary rent only when they provide interest groups with financial resources that market would not. The parameter α , which takes a value between 0 and 1, denotes the weight that the state places on the payoff from the rent. I dub it as 'rent-seeking rate'. The rent-seeking rate may be considered the type of a state: a lower α indicates a better type. 
Solving the Model
It is easy to notice that (IC) should hold as an equality at the solution of the model, which allows to write I in terms of f.
Define to be the level of financial flows at which I becomes zero. Inserting (E3) into (E2), unless the optimality is attained at , the necessary condition of optimality is obtained as follows.
The first term corresponds to the marginal rent benefit to the state from the intervention. The second term, which is always negative at the solution level of f as long as α takes a non-zero value, shows the marginal cost to the state from social welfare decrease.
13 Finally, the last term, which is always non-positive, indicates an additional marginal cost to the state of intervention due to the political cost.
12 Before closing the section, it is notable that the presented model may be seen applicable for other regulated industries as well. In this regard, one may contend why the paper focuses only on state intervention in financial system instead of addressing state intervention in general. The reason is that, despite the possibility that the model has relevancy for general state intervention, the model is most appropriate for state intervention in financial system. For example, provision of guaranteeing reservation return based on tax money is an important feature of the financial system in most of developing economies. In addition, rent-seeking by politicians are mostly through manipulation of financial resource allocation. 13 The second term always takes negative values at the solution level because the solution level of f is larger than for positive S f α , which is easy to see.
(E4) does not completely describe the optimality condition for the model, because d(I) and C(I) are not differentiable at . Therefore, if some value of f satisfies (E4), it is necessary to check whether it gives a larger value to the objective function than .
In case such f does not exist, is the state's equilibrium.
Type of the State
Suppose that for a given non-zero value of α , is lower than . The state finds the level of financial flows that maximizes its objective function at which the transfer of I is not necessary. By definition, C(I), d(I) and their derivatives take zeroes at such so that (E4) can be simplified to
From (E5) the relationship between α and can be easily established. As C f α becomes larger, the marginal rent of f to the sate increases while the marginal cost of f to the state in terms of the social profit decreases. Therefore, as long as remains below , the state can be better off by choosing higher for a higher
In other words, a state that puts more weight on the private rent against the social welfare will choose larger amount of financial flows at the cost of social welfare. This monotonic relationship between α and , however, does not necessarily hold for the whole range of
, which the proposition 1 shows. 
Proposition 1:
C f , which maximizes , is non-decreasing in ) ( )] ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( I C I d f f B S p − − − + π α α ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ α .α α ∈ 0 f 0 α α = 0 α 0 f 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 0 0 0 0 = ′ − + ′ f f B S p π α α and . RK f S β π = ) ( 0
(c) may be constant or increasing in depending on functional properties of and C(I). Specifically,
where is the right hand side derivative of
, where
The first two parts of the proposition describe that for a relatively small α in the range of , a state chooses levels of financial flows where the transfer does not occur. This is so because a state that gives a relatively higher priority to the social welfare prefers avoiding tax-distortion d to pursuing larger f and more private rent. f The third part of the proposition describes the behaviour of a state with a relatively larger rent seeking rate, specifically α larger than . Since states of this category prefer more private rents instead of social welfare compared to the previous group of states, it might be expected that those states would choose even larger financial flows at the cost of more social welfare. However, it should be noted that once the amount of financial flows reaches so that profits decreases below the private shareholders' reservation return rate, the transfer financed by tax collection should be made. Such positive transfer supported by tax entails an additional source of the marginal cost to the state for the increase of f, namely the distortion cost d(I) and the political cost C(I).
While the marginal benefit of f to the state remains as
. In view of the comparative static with respect to changes in the rent seeking rate α , the third term due to the political cost C(I) needs an attention. For the same level of f, increase of the rent seeking rate α raises the marginal benefit to the state by ) ( f B p ′ and decreases the marginal cost by
, the solution level of should increase along with C f α . But, in the presence of the political cost interesting dynamics may occur, because changes in the rent seeking rate do not affect the marginal political cost of f to the state. At a selected level of f, the state meets the same magnitude of the political cost regardless of the specific value of α . In addition, the nature of the political cost is assumed to arise only for positive tax collection or f larger than , which implies that the marginal political cost of f to the state jumps from zero to a certain positive number at . Combining the observations, when the rent seeking rate 0 f 0 f α changes from the levels below to those of over , in determining whether it should increase the state needs to consider the effect on the political cost. If the jump rise of the political cost outweighs the payoff increase from enlarged private rent and the social welfare concern change, despite the change in 
Fiscal Reform
Proposition 1 and the subsequent discussion display the role of political cost or political monitoring in the model. The existence of political monitoring deters rent seeking of the state. Proposition 1(c) shows that if political monitoring is strict so that the marginal political cost to the state is sufficiently large, the state will not increase financial flows to pursue more rents even when its desire for rents rises. But, the deterrence exerted by the political monitoring has its limit. Unless the rent seeking rate is zero and, so the state obtains positive payoff from rents, no matter how large the marginal political cost becomes, financial flows determined by the state cannot be reduced to the levels below . Since is larger than the social optimum , excessive financial intermediation owing to the rent-seeking still remains.
Remark: Fiscal reform that raises the marginal political cost of the tax collection for the transfer I reduces the extent of state intervention or the level of
for . But, it has no effect on for .
That the political monitoring is limited in removing rent-seeking stems from the assumed nature of the political monitoring. The political cost in the model is triggered by positive tax collection rather than rent-seeking behaviour itself. Under the assumption, as long as profits are large enough to cover the reservation return for private shareholders, the state will pursue excessive financial intermediation and associated rents without facing the political cost.
Privatization
Other than the political cost, the reservation return for private shareholders is the constraint that the state needs to consider in determining . Specifically, from (E3) and (E4) it can be seen that is likely to decrease in
β because higher β requires larger I that will lead to higher political costs to the state. Importantly, unlike fiscal reform, even when takes , rivatization that increases intervention completely or from exceeding as long as there exists positive externality that state intervention can exploit. This is so because by taking advantage of profitability improvement, state can increase amount of financial flows exceeding the socially optimal, without incurring insurance payment that entails tax collection. 
DISCUSSION
The Developmental State and the Derogatory State
Now based on the analyses above, I discuss two factors that affect welfare-outcome of state intervention. Note that the change in social welfare due to state intervention, which I denote by L, can be written as:
Since L is a function of , direct implications for social welfare can be drawn from Proposition 1 and 2. Proposition 1 reveals the relationship between social welfare and the type of a state. First of all, Proposition 1(a) shows that L takes the positive maximum at
, resulting in the largest social welfare improvement. It represents the case of the 'social planner state'. Also Proposition 1(b) says that despite being worse than the social planner state case, sufficiently small values of α will ensure state intervention to be welfare enhancing. I summarise the observation as follows.
Proposition 3:
In the presence of exploitable externality, difference of social welfare due to state intervention is non-decreasing in the rent-seeking rate α . Specifically, if α is less than , social welfare improves by state intervention, where is defined as follows: ,
Next, Proposition 1 and 2 together indicate another channel that prevents excessive state intervention, even when the rent-seeking rate is large: larger value of β and larger marginal political cost will bring down state intervention, increasing L. In particular, if the financial system is fully privatized and the shareholders can demand sufficiently large profit as the reservation return, large enough marginal political cost will preclude welfare-impairing state intervention. Proposition 3 above indicates that as long as a state has large rent-seeking motive, state intervention will be welfare impairing. But, privatization and fiscal reform can limit the extent of welfare loss.
Remark:
In the presence of positive externality exploitable by state intervention, change in social welfare due to state intervention is non-decreasing in β and marginal political cost.
Overall, state intervention may result in different social welfare consequences because of two reasons. State intervention gives rise to different welfare outcomes simply because states put different weights on social welfare. Alternatively, state intervention entails various social welfare consequences because privatization rates and political scrutiny on tax collection differ across economies.
Persistence of State Control
Previous analyses also indicate why state intervention in the financial system persists despite privatization and/or fiscal reforms. Even after full privatization and fiscal reform, state has an incentive to exert control rights because room for rent seeking or/and social welfare improving exist. In fact, prevention of state control of the financial system requires several conditions to be met simultaneously, which I specify in Proposition 4. 
When the specified four conditions hold at the same time, a state do not receive any benefit from intervening in the financial system. Hence, any political pressure against state intervention would stop a state from exerting control rights over the financial system. Proposition 4 shows that extra conditions are necessary to stop state control in addition to full privatization and fiscal reform. First, no externality exploitable by state intervention should exist. In plain words, the condition says that state should be no better than the private, or state intervention should not be capable of improving profitability of the financial system. Otherwise, a state will intervene to increase financial flows by exploiting externality. Next condition is related to the competition and industrial structure of the financial system: private profitability of financial institutions should not exceed the reservation return rate. If the condition is not satisfied while the other three conditions of the proposition hold, a state will intervene since it can increase financial flows to its benefit until profitability of the financial industry is reduced to private investors' reservation rate.
CONCLUSION
I offer a framework to address questions on state intervention in the financial system. The answer is based on the idea that state intervention becomes possible as the state is equipped with institutional capacity to exert control rights over the financial system. In the presence of such institutional precondition, the state will intervene in financial resource allocation to seek private rents and/or improve social welfare. As the state has control rights, other institutional characters such as degree of privatization, fiscal discipline, private stake holders' reservation return rates and existence of externality form only the constraint environment in the state maximizing its benefits.
The model sheds light on why we observe various social welfare outcomes across interventionist economies. Difference in the rent-seeking motive of a state is a trivial reason. More importantly, state intervention yields different welfare results because institutional conditions constituting the constraint environment of state intervention differ among economies. In addition, the model shows why piecemeal reforms cannot eliminate state intervention. Since privatization or fiscal reform alone implies a change in each constraint, it may limit the extent of state intervention, but cannot stop the state from intervening. Overall, the paper argues that institution matters both for the welfare consequence and elimination of state intervention. 
α while α is in the range of . That is larger than is obvious. To see that is less than , assume the opposite, namely or . But, if holds, the
following inequalities should hold, giving rise to a contradiction:
where the first equality is due to the necessary condition of the optimality for , the first inequality while both 
The inequality implies that the state can raise the value of the objective function by choosing a smaller level of f than , contradicting the definition of . Hence, should hold.
is less than , the necessary condition of the optimality says that . The equation establishes that as 
Now to prove (c)(i), assume that is larger than . Then, by the necessary condition of the optimality for , I have
Notice that the right hand side of (A1-2) increases in and, therefore, it decreases toward the lower bound as decreases toward its lower bound . Specifically, letting be the lower bound of
, is written as:
If the condition of (c)(i) holds, becomes larger than 1 for any from (A1-3). Since it violates the initial assumption of , it follows that under the condition of (c)(i), must be equal to .
Now assume that the condition of (c)(ii) holds so that . In case or , must be equal to for . This is so because if is larger than , it contradicts the initial assumption that 
(A2-3)
Contradiction arises since under the assumption of being equal to the second term of (A2-3) is zero while the first term is positive. . Now I need to show that this minimum is equal to under the given conditions. Notice that in terms of Proposition 1, the given case is equivalent to when and . Then, taking advantage of the proof for Proposition 1(c), it suffices to show that if I assume that is larger than for any , contradiction arises. Now from (A1-2), if is larger than , the condition of for any positive 
